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Abstract This paper analyzes the compliance with social norms optimally estab-
lished by a benevolent central planner. Since compliance is costly, agents have an
incentive to free-ride on others, in a public good game. We distinguish two types of
agents: standard pro-self agents (Sanchos) whose payoffs are defined by a prisoner’s
dilemma game dominated by the non-compliance strategy, and pro-social Quixotes,
who still have an incentive to free-ride, although prefer compliance over mutual
defection (as in a snowdrift game). Compliance is analyzed in a two-population
evolutionary game considering an imitative revision protocol. Individuals from one
population play against and imitate agents within their own but also the other popu-
lation. Inter-population interaction and imitation allow us to investigate under which
circumstances some Sanchos might imitate compliant Quixotes, so escaping the
non-compliance equilibrium characteristic of an isolated population of Sanchos.
Correspondingly, we analyze the conditions under which the interaction with the
population of selfish Sanchos increases or decreases the compliance rate among al-
truistic Quixotes.
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1 Introduction
Compliance with social norms can be analyzed as a collective action problem. Al-
though collective actions may be jointly beneficial, a classical result, as stated by
Olson (1971), is that no self-interested person would contribute in the production
of a public good (except in the case of a very small group or under a mechanism
like coercion). This zero contribution thesis corresponds to the Nash equilibrium
in a prisoner’s dilemma game. For the public good game (the generalization of the
prisoner’s dilemma to a large number of players), defection is the dominant strategy.
Thus, classical game theory and also evolutionary game theory predict zero contri-
bution (see, for example, Miller and Andreoni 1991). Nevertheless, experimental
economics seems to contradict this zero contribution hypothesis. For example, An-
dreoni (1988) and later Ostrom (2000), revise the literature on public goods experi-
ments, finding positive levels of contribution in one-shot and repeated games. Many
examples of collective actions also exist in everyday life: voting, not cheating on
taxes, contributions to voluntary associations, or recycling.
The literature provides alternative explanations to reconcile the standard theory
with the evidence of individual behavior. Andreoni (1988) suggests that individual
behavior, at least in the laboratory, is not exclusively oriented by self-interest but
also by factors like altruism, social norms or bounded rationality. Here, we focus
on the idea that individuals, or at least some individuals, can derive enjoyment from
collaboration independently of how much their actions benefit others. This effect is
called intrinsic satisfaction in de Young (1996), or “warm-glow” in the more stan-
dard terminology, like in Andreoni (1990). As long as social norms are perceived as
ideal forms of behavior, compliance provides a warm-glow to each particular com-
pliant agent, which is a supplementary benefit to the public good.1 Alternatively,
1 Other factors not analyzed here are inequity aversion, reciprocal altruism, sense of identity or
preference for efficiency (see, Alger and Weibull 2013 and references therein). The temporal di-
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individuals get dis-utility from doing bad. Thus, as long as not following social
norms is perceived as doing bad, defection involves a cold-prickle, following the
terminology in Andreoni (1995), who highlighted the asymmetry between doing
good versus not doing bad.
An economy populated by different types of individuals, some more inclined to
collaborate than others was proposed by Ostrom (2000), from an evolutionary per-
spective. The existence of “norm-using” individuals, unlike the standard rational
egoists, helps bring the theory closer to the findings in the laboratory.2 More re-
cently, Grafton et at. (2017), consider the society as a mixture of standard “Nashian”
individuals (who maximize their utility taking as given the strategies of others) and
“Kantian” individuals (who do not do anything that they would not like if everyone
behaves in the same way). We consider a society composed of two different types
of agents: rational egoists or pro-self individuals, which we call Sanchos; and norm-
using or pro-social individuals, called Quixotes. Both follow a “Nashian” behavior,
and their strategic behavior changes according to the evolutionary dynamics.
The preferences of rational egoist Sanchos are captured by a payoff matrix of
the prisoner’s dilemma type with a strong incentive to free-ride (the most widely
used paradigm to study human cooperation). In contrast, pro-social3 Quixotes expe-
rience a warm-glow from compliance, together with a cold-prickle from defection.
The free-riding incentive still persists when the opponent complies, however, if the
opponent defects, compliance is their best strategy. Thus, for pro-social Quixotes
the compliance dilemma is relaxed, described as a snowdrift game (also known as
hawk-dove or chicken game), as proposed, for example, in Doebeli et al. (2004). Our
mension can also make compliance more rewarding. For pollution problems, current abatement
activities can be beneficial when the future cleaner environment is taken into account. An interest-
ing example is Breton et al. (2010), who propose a dynamic game for international environmental
agreements that takes into account the pollution stock dynamics, as well as the membership dy-
namics, defined by an evolutionary process.
2 The mixture of rational egoists and norm-users results from an indirect evolutionary approach,
proposed by Gu¨th and Yaari (1992) and Gu¨th (1995). Preferences are also considered as strategies
subject to evolutionary selection in Alger and Weibull (2013), for whom natural selection has built
preferences as a convex combination between selfishness and morality.
3 In the same way as Don Quixote sought to behave in accordance with his reading of chivalry,
pro-social individuals perceive social norms as ideal forms of behavior.
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setting follows Cabo and Garcı´a-Gonza´lez (2018) who analyze a two-population
evolutionary game in between a symmetric and an asymmetric game. Individuals be-
longing to one population play against and imitate individuals within their own and
also the other population. The evolutionary dynamics converges towards a mixed
strategy equilibrium at which some Sanchos might find it attractive to imitate the
compliant behavior of Quixotes, though it is not in their best interest. This answers
the question which typically intrigues a reader of “The Ingenious Gentleman Don
Quixote of La Mancha”:4 What led the pragmatic and rational Sancho to follow the
“madness” of the morally oriented Don Quixote? Or put differently: under which
circumstances does the existence of a population of pro-social individuals induce
standard pro-self individuals to comply with the social rules when it is in their best
interest not to do so? A positive answer requires a much higher reward to compli-
ance for Quixotes than for Sanchos.
We extend Cabo and Garcı´a-Gonza´lez (2018) by relaxing the assumption that
the global population is equally divided between Sanchos and Quixotes. We ana-
lyze how compliance decisions in either population are affected by their relative
sizes. Considering a pairwise imitation protocol, the relative size of each population
determines the likelihood of being paired with an individual within this particular
population. At the same time, it directly influences the share of compliance in the
global population and, in consequence, the incentives to free-ride when others com-
ply or to comply when others do not.
The analysis shows that the likelihood that some Sanchos imitate the compliant
behavior of Quixotes increases with the ratio of Sanchos in the overall population.5
Conversely, when the ratio of Sanchos is very small, they would certainly free-
ride on compliant Quixotes, unless these latter get a very large warm-glow from
compliance. This warm-glow makes it more likely compliance among Sanchos, and
it also increases the actual compliance rates for both agents, Sanchos and Quixotes.
A larger ratio of Sanchos undoubtedly reduces the share of compliance in the
global population. However, its effect on the share of compliance within the popula-
4 Originally titled: El ingenioso hidalgo don Quijote de la Mancha, by Miguel de Cervantes Saave-
dra (1605 Part I and 1615 Part II).
5 Similar result is obtained in Bontems and Rotillon (2000), for pollution compliance in a popula-
tion divided between honest polluters (always comply) and opportunistic individuals.
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tion of Quixotes is twofold. A snowdrift effect induces Quixotes to increase compli-
ance because the compliance rate in the global population is smaller. Conversely, an
imitation effect leads Quixotes to reduce compliance following the non-compliant
behavior of Sanchos. The positive effect becomes more important the greater the
warm-glow, making more likely that a higher ratio of Sanchos induces higher com-
pliance among Quixotes. On the other hand, the ratio of Sanchos, first raises com-
pliance within this population although, with less and less Quixotes, Sanchos hardly
meet and imitate Quixotes and compliance rates decrease to zero.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the preferences
of Sanchos and Quixotes. The two-population evolutionary game and the associated
dynamics are introduced in Section 3. The two types of equilibria with and with-
out compliance among Sanchos are computed in Section 4. Section 5 studies how
compliance in each population is affected by the discrepancy between Sanchos and
Quixotes, and by the relative sizes of these populations. It also presents some real
life examples. Section 6 concludes.
2 Two distinct populations
This section explains the distinct behavior of pro-self Sanchos and norm-using
Quixotes when they face a collective action problem like compliance with social
norms. We assume that if the social norms are followed by all individuals, then they
all will be better off.6 The collective action problem is perceived as: a prisoner’s
dilemma game for Sanchos, and a snowdrift game for Quixotes.
The population of Sanchos represents the standard rational agents, whose payoff
matrix collects the canonical representation of a collective action problem:
C D
C (1,1) (1−d,1+ c−d)
D (1+ c−d,1−d) (0,0)
6 Norms are optimally chosen by a benevolent central planner, or they are the result of a social
learning process.
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Net gains when both players comply are normalized to 1. Parameter c represents the
effort or the cost of compliance, and d is the damage caused by a non-compliant
player. Thus, the gap c− d > 0 determines the incentive to free ride on the other,
which induces the agent to disobey as long as his opponent complies. Moreover,
in a prisoner’s dilemma game a player prefers defection also when the opponent
defects. This incentive is measured by 1−d < 0, which is less pronounced than the
free-riding incentive if the opponent complies:
σ ≡ c−d− (d−1)> 0, with 1 < d < c. (1)
Notice that the restriction 1 < d < c ensures that defection is the dominant strategy
among Sanchos. The restriction σ > 0 is that the sum of the off-diagonal payoffs
is greater than the sum of the diagonal payoffs. Thus, in the population of Sanchos
the player’s gains from defection, as opposed to compliance,is greater when the
opponent complies, i.e. c−d > d−1. Under this prisoner’s dilemma specification,
the unique Nash equilibrium is the standard situation of mutual defection.
The population of Quixotes attains a greater reward for compliance and a lower
reward for defection than the population of Sanchos. They attach a warm-glow to
compliance, wg≥ 0, and a cold-prickle to defection, cp≥ 0. Thus, their payoffs can
be computed as:
C D
C (1+wg,1+wg) (1−d+wg,1+ c−d− cp)
D (1+ c−d− cp,1−d+wg) (−cp,−cp)
The warm-glow associated with compliance and the cold-prickle associated with de-
fection makes compliance more attractive and defection less so. The social dilemma
for the population of Quixotes is described as a snowdrift (Hawk-Dove or chicken)
game. This implies that the joint effect of the warm-glow and the cold-prickle is not
enough to counterbalance the free-riding incentive when the opponent complies:
wg+cp < c−d. In contrast, this joint effect is strong enough to induce compliance
when the opponent disobeys wg+ cp > d−1. In what follows, this joint effect will
be denoted as ε = wg+ cp. In consequence, the warm-glow from compliance and
the cold-prickle from defection can be expressed as: wg = αε , cp = (1−α)ε , with
α ∈ [0,1]. While ε is a quantitative measure of the distance between Sanchos and
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Quixotes, parameter α can be interpreted as a qualitative measure of this distance,
that measures the relative importance of the warm-glow over the cold-prickle. Note
that wg/cp = α/(1−α), and it moves between 0 and ∞ as α moves between 0 and
1. Given this notation, the snowdrift structure of this matrix requires conditions in
(1) together with:
d−1 < ε < c−d. (2)
For such a game, mutual defection is no longer a Nash equilibrium. It is character-
ized by a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies:7
(∆ ,1−∆) =
(
ε− (d−1)
σ
,
c−d− ε
σ
)
∈ (0,1)× (0,1). (3)
The expression ∆ represents a relative measure of the the incentive to comply
when the opponent disobeys. Corresponding, 1−∆ provides the relative measure of
the free-riding incentive when the opponent complies. These two values are positive
under condition (2) and the assumption σ > 0. The greater the absolute distance
which separates Sanchos and Quixotes, ε , the greater the incentive to comply if the
opponent disobeys, and the lower the free-riding incentive if the opponent complies
(see Figure 1). However, ∆ , is independent of α , i.e. of whether Quixotes attach a
large warm-glow to compliance or a strong cold-prickle to non-compliance.
0 d−1 ε c−d
σ
σ∆ σ(1−∆)
Fig. 1 Incentives to comply/free-ride
In addition to the definition of ∆ , we introduce two new expressions:
∆wg =
αε− (d−1)
σ
, ∆cp =
(1−α)ε− (d−1)
σ
. (4)
These expressions can be positive or negative. A positive ∆wg implies that the warm-
glow from compliance for Quixotes, αε , is by itself, a strong enough incentive to
7 As well as two asymmetric pure Nash equilibria, (1,0), (0,1).
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induce compliance when the opponent defeats. Likewise, a positive ∆cp > 0 implies
that the Quixote’s preference for compliance when the opponent defeats could be
based only on the cold-prickle she associates to defection (with no need of warm-
glow from compliance).
In what follows, unless said otherwise, the illustrative examples will consider the
following parameters’ values:
c = 1.6, d = 1.1, ε = 0.4. (5)
For these parameters it holds that σ = 0.4> 0, ∆ = 0.75, d−1= 0.1< c−d = 0.5,
satisfying conditions (1) and (2). Moreover, ∆wg = α−1/4 and ∆cp = 3/4−α .
3 Interaction and imitation between and within populations
The first specificity of the two-population game analyzed here is that individuals in
one population play against individuals of their own kind but also of the other pop-
ulation. We assume a unit mass population divided between Sanchos and Quixotes.
The share of Sanchos in the overall population is represented by constant s ∈ (0,1),
and hence 1−s represents the ratio of Quixotes. Both types of players have the same
set of two strategies: compliance and defection, {C,D}. Importantly, while they can
switch between strategies, their preferences do not vary, and hence, they remain
within their population. Thus, the set of social states in this two-population game
can be written as, X = {x= (ps,(1− p)s,q(1− s),(1−q)(1− s)) : p,q ∈ [0,1]},
with p (resp. q) the ratio of agents in the population of Sanchos (resp. Quixotes)
who comply.
For each social state, x, the payoff function for the two-population game can be
computed as Fx′ with,
F =

1 1−d 1 1−d
1+c−d 0 1+c−d 0
1+αε 1−d+αε 1+αε 1−d+αε
1+c−d−(1−α)ε −(1−α)ε 1+c−d−(1−α)ε −(1−α)ε
.
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For simplicity we will refer to the total population which complies (adding up San-
chos and Quixotes), denoted by y = ps+q(1− s). Then the payoffs Fx′ for the two
populations can be rewritten as a function of y:8
pi(y) =

piSC(y)
piSD(y)
piQC (y)
piQD (y)
=

1−d+dy
y(1+ c−d)
1−d+dy+αε
y(1+ c−d)− (1−α)ε
 . (6)
From (6) it is clear that the expected payoff for Quixotes surpasses the expected
payoff for Sanchos in the warm-glow, αε , while defection is less rewarding in the
cold-prickle, (1−α)ε .
piQC (y) = pi
S
C(y)+αε, pi
Q
D (y) = pi
S
D(y)− (1−α)ε.
As α approaches 1, the differences between Sanchos and Quixotes particularizes on
the warm-glow from compliance, and the payoff to defection converges for the two
populations. Conversely, when α tends to 0, the gap between populations particular-
izes in the cold-prickle from non-compliance, while compliance is equally valued
by the two type of agents.
Comparing the payoffs between strategies for the same population it follows:
piSD(y)−piSC(y) = (d−1)+σy > 0, piQD (y)−piQC (y) = σ(y−∆).
Within the population of Sanchos, defection always dominates compliance regard-
less of y. As for Quixotes, whether they prefer compliance or defection depends
on how the share of compliance in the global population compares to ∆ . As shown
in expression (3), the expression ∆ (which represents the NE or the ESS if only a
single population of Quixotes existed) takes values within the interval (0,1), due to
the snowdrift structure of the payoff matrix for Quixotes. These later would prefer
to comply when few individuals comply, y < ∆ , and would prefer to defect in the
opposite case.
8 Superscripts S and Q refer to Sanchos and Quixotes, respectively. Subscripts C and D to compli-
ance and defection.
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A population game defined exclusively for the population of Sanchos would be
characterized by the convergence towards an evolutionary stable strategy of zero
compliance. Similarly, for a population of Quixotes, the compliance rate at the
equilibrium would be ∆ . Our main interest is to analyze the equilibrium for the
two-population game proposed. With that aim, the imitation mechanism must be
specified. And it is this mechanism which constitutes the second main feature of the
proposed two-population game.
Considering an imitative revision protocol, the temporal evolution of the com-
pliance rate in each population is determined by the share of non-compliance times
the probability of switching to compliance, minus the share of compliance times the
probability of switching to defection:
p˙ = (1− p)ρSDC− pρSCD, (7)
q˙ = (1−q)ρQDC−qρQCD, (8)
where ρhi j is the probability that an individual in population h∈ {S,Q} playing strat-
egy i ∈ {C,D} switches to the alternative strategy j ∈ {C,D}, j 6= i. This probabil-
ity is determined by the likelihood that a revising agent is paired with an individ-
ual playing the alternative strategy, times the conditional imitation rate, rhi j. In the
standard formulation of multi-population games (see, for example Sandholm 2010),
when an individual in population h receives a revision opportunity, she can only be
paired with other individuals within her own population. Hence the likelihood of
meeting someone playing the alternative strategy is given by the ratio of individuals
in population h playing this alternative strategy j. Thus, for Sanchos, the probabil-
ity of switching from compliance to defection would read ρSCD = (1− p)rSCD, and the
mirror probability of switching from defection to compliance, ρSDC = prSDC (similarly
for Quixotes, changing p by q, and rSi j by r
Q
i j). Our proposal adds the possibility that
she could also imitate the behavior of the agents belonging to the alternative popu-
lation. Thus the probabilities of switching her strategy depend on the likelihood of
being paired with someone in her own and also in the other population, who plays
the alternative strategy. Hence, for Sanchos and Quixotes, this probabilities read:
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ρSCD = (1− p)srSSCD +(1−q)(1− s)rSQCD, ρSDC = psrSSDC +q(1− s)rSQDC, (9)
ρQCD = (1− p)srQSCD +(1−q)(1− s)rQQCD , ρQDC = psrQSDC +q(1− s)rQQDC , (10)
where rhki j , with h,k,∈ {S,Q}, and i, j ∈ {C,D}, represents the conditional imitation
rate of an agent in population h playing strategy i who is paired with an agent in
population k playing strategy j 6= i.
Assuming a revision protocol governed by pairwise imitation, the conditional
imitation rate is proportional to the gap between the payoffs of the randomly chosen
opponent and the revising player. Thus, the conditional imitation rate of an i-player
in population h who meets a j-player in population k reads:
rhki j ≡ rhki j (y) = [pikj (y)−pihi (y)]+, (11)
where [z]+= z if z> 0 and 0 otherwise. It is important to notice that imitation is only
driven by the gap between payoffs, and individuals in one population will equally
imitate agents from their same or the other population.9
A compliance individual, who can be a Sancho or a Quixote, can be paired with
non-compliant Sanchos or non-compliant Quixotes. This gives a matrix of pay-
offs comparisons describing the conditional imitation rates from compliance to de-
fection, GCD(y) =
(
rhkCD(y)
)
2×2, with h,k ∈ {S,Q}. Likewise, the matrix GDC(y) =(
rhkDC(y)
)
2×2 collects the conditional imitation rates from defection to compliance.
10
GCD(y) =
 [piSD−piSC]+ [piQD −piSC]+
[piSD−piQC ]+ [piQD −piQC ]+
= σ
y+ d−1σ [y−∆cp]+
[y−∆wg]+ [y−∆ ]+
 . (12)
GDC(y) =
 [piSC−piSD]+ [piQC −piSD]+
[piSC−piQD ]+ [piQC −piQD ]+
= σ
0 [∆wg− y]+
[∆cp− y]+ [∆ − y]+
 . (13)
9 One might introduce asymmetries, assuming that individuals are more willing to imitate their
own kind rather than individuals belonging to the other population. We restrict to the symmetric
case for simplicity of the exposition.
10 The y argument in the payoffs functions is removed when no confusion can arise.
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These matrices show the conditional imitation rates of a row individual belonging to
a given population that meets a column individual from her or the other population
playing the alternative strategy.
Fig. 2 Regions
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These matrices help distinguish five regions in the α−y plane (see Figure 2). The
payoffs comparison is dependent on the share of the total population that complies,
y, and on whether Quixotes attain great warm-glow from compliance (α close to
one), or strong cold-prickle from rules transgression (α close to zero). The warm-
glow is relatively more important than the cold-prickle if α > 1/2, and vice versa.
From the prisoner’s dilemma structure of the game for Sanchos, compliant San-
chos will always imitate non-compliant Sanchos and never the reverse: rSSCD > 0 and
rSSDC = 0. As for the other matching pairs, Figure 2 displays five different regions,
and highlights in each region when a non-compliant agent does worse than (and
hence imitate), a compliant individual, either belonging to her own or the alterna-
tive population.11 From the snowdrift structure of the game for Quixotes, when the
share of compliance in the global population is small, y < ∆ , non-compliance is
highly detrimental for Quixotes who will be willing to imitate compliant Quixotes,
rQQDC > 0. Conversely in region U, y > ∆ and the opposite occurs: rQQCD > 0.
If the warm-glow from compliance for Quixotes is strong (∆wg > 0), and if y <
∆wg, non-compliant Sanchos might find attractive to imitate compliant Quixotes,
11 In the cases for which nothing is said, non-compliance provides a higher payoff.
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rSQDC > 0 (in regions R and B ). However, if y > ∆wg then compliant Quixotes would
imitate non-compliant Sanchos, rQSCD > 0. On the other hand, if the cold-prickle from
defection is strong, (∆cp > 0) and compliance is small y < ∆cp, then non-compliant
Quixotes would be inclined to imitate compliant Sanchos, rQSDC > 0. Conversely, for
y > ∆cp, compliant Sanchos would imitate non-compliant Quixotes, rSQCD > 0.
4 Two asymptotically stable equilibria
The evolutionary dynamics is characterized by the mean dynamics in (7)-(8), the
probabilities of switching strategies in (9)-(10), and the conditional imitation rates
defined in (12)-(13). For this evolutionary dynamics in variables (p,q), presented
in (26)-(27) in the Appendix, next proposition characterizes the different possible
equilibria.
Proposition 1. The evolutionary dynamics in (26)-(27) presents two unstable equi-
libria, characterized by either full compliance, (p∗,q∗) = (1,1), or zero compliance
(p∗,q∗) = (0,0). Moreover, under condition (2) there also exists a unique asymp-
totically stable fixed point of the evolutionary dynamics. This equilibrium can be of
two types:12
1. Scenario Q can be characterized by an upper bound on the warm-glow from
compliance:
wg≡ αε ≤ s(d−1)+(1− s)(c−d)≡ α̂ε, (14)
or equivalently, in terms of the share of Sanchos in the overall population:
s≤ 1− αε− (d−1)
σ
≡ 1−∆wg ≡ sˆ. (15)
Under this condition, the equilibrium lies within regions L or M, with
p∗Q = 0, q
∗
Q =
1+∆ −
√
(1−∆)2+4(1−α)sε/σ
2(1− s) ∈ (0,1). (16)
2. The scenario SQ is characterized by the opposite condition:
12 Subscript Q highlights that only Quixotes comply, while subscript SQ indicates that both
Quixotes and Sanchos comply.
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wg≡ αε > s(d−1)+(1− s)(c−d)≡ α̂ε. (17)
or equivalently,
s > 1−∆wg ≡ sˆ. (18)
The equilibrium lies within regions R or B, with:
p∗SQ =
−2σ(1−s)−(d−1)+
√
[d−1]2+4σαε(1−s)
2σs
∈(0,1), q∗SQ = 1. (19)
Proof. See Appendix.
Under condition (14), (0,q∗Q) is the unique asymptotically stable equilibrium,
while under condition (17), the unique asymptotically stable equilibrium is given by
(p∗SQ,1). The evolution of the share of compliance for Sanchos and Quixotes towards
either of these two equilibria is depicted in Figures 3 and 4, for the parameters’
values in (5). Additionally, Figure 3 considers (s = 0.5, α = 0.6) a lower ratio of
Sanchos and a smaller warm-glow than Figure 4 (s = 0.8, α = 0.7).
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Fig. 3 (p,q) for s = 0.5, α = 0.6
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Fig. 4 (p,q) for s = 0.8, α = 0.7
Under condition (17), compliant Quixotes do better than non-compliant Quixotes,
and more importantly, also better than non-compliant Sanchos. And this remains
true no matter how large the ratio of compliant Quixotes. Therefore, all Quixotes
would end-up complying. When non-compliant Sanchos who revise their strategy
are paired to compliant Quixotes, some switch to compliance, which leaves a pos-
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itive rate of compliance among formerly disobedient Sanchos, pSQ > 0. The equi-
librium in regions B or R is then characterized by a unitary compliance rate for
Quixotes and a positive compliance rate for Sanchos (see Figure 4). Conversely,
under condition (14), there is a threshold above which non-compliant Sanchos do
better. Hence, as the number of compliant Quixotes increases, non-compliance be-
comes more attractive and ends up being the dominant strategy in the population of
Sanchos.
Corollary 1. The threshold α̂ε ∈ (d− 1,c− d) tends to c− d when s tends to 0,
and to d− 1 when s tends to 1. Therefore, if αε < d− 1 < α̂ε , the equilibrium in
scenario Q is the only feasible equilibrium regardless of the value of s.
As Figure 5 shows, scenario SQ involving compliance among Sanchos, requires
Quixotes who attach a sufficiently large warm-glow to compliance, wg > α̂ε . The
greater the ratio of Sanchos in the overall population, s, the lower will be (as we will
see later on) the share of compliance in the total population, y, and hence the stronger
the reward that Quixotes obtain from compliance. Therefore, when paired with
them, non-compliant Sanchos will imitate their compliant behavior. Conversely, if
the ratio of Sanchos in the global population is very small, s→ 0, then the thresh-
old α̂ε rises towards c−d. But since αε ≤ ε < c−d condition wg > α̂ε becomes
highly demanding.
0 d−1
α̂ε wg
c−d
Q SQ
(s→ 1) (s→ 0)
Fig. 5 Equilibrium type and warm-glow
According to this corollary, a solution SQ, with a positive compliance rate among
Sanchos, is never feasible, if the warm-glow associated to compliance is not enough,
by itself, to induce compliance among Quixotes (αε < d− 1, i.e. ∆wg < 0). That
is, if the willingness to comply for Quixotes when many other do not requires a
strong cold-prickle from defection, then the payoff to compliant Quixotes is never
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large enough to induce imitation to non-compliant Sanchos. Therefore, Sanchos
stick to their non-compliant dominant strategy. This is true regardless of how large
the quantitative difference between Sanchos and Quixotes might be.
Corollary 2. A positive share of compliance among Quixotes requires:
ε > ε(s)≡ d−1
1− s(1−α) , with ε(s) ∈
(
d−1, d−1
α
)
, ε ′(s)≤ 0. (20)
Conditions in (2) are not enough to guarantee compliance in the two-population
game. If the share of Sanchos in the overall population, s, tends to 0, then ε tends
to d− 1 and the condition (20) coincides with the lower bound in (2). However, if
s→ 1 condition (20) converges to the condition of a positive ∆wg, i.e. the warm-glow
from compliance must be enough to induce compliance among Quixotes even with
no cold-prickle from defection. Thus, ∆wg > 0 is a sufficient condition for q∗Q > 0,
regardless of the value of s.
Next proposition presents the main features of the two equilibria described in
Proposition 1 and depicted in Figures 3 and 4.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium under scenario Q is characterized by y∗Q > ∆wg,
p∗Q = 0 and q∗Q given in (16) satisfying:
q∗Q R ∆ ⇔ wg≡ αε R d−1+σ∆ 2(1− s), (21)
or equivalently
q∗Q R ∆ ⇔ sR 1−
∆wg
∆ 2
. (22)
The equilibrium under scenario SQ is characterized by y∗SQ < ∆wg, q∗SQ = 1 and
p∗SQ ∈ (0,1) given in (19).
Proof. See Appendix.
To interpret this proposition in terms of the warm-glow, notice first that d−1≤
d− 1+σ∆ 2(1− s) ≤ α̂ε. As represented in Figure 6, if the warm-glow satisfies
wg ∈ (d− 1,d− 1+σ∆ 2(1− s)), only Quixotes comply, and the share of compli-
ance in this population remains below its equilibrium value in a single population
of Quixotes, ∆ . A larger warm-glow, wg ∈ (d− 1+σ∆ 2(1− s), α̂ε), would push
their compliance rate above ∆ , but Sanchos still refuse to comply. They will only
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0 d−1 d−1+σ(1− s) α̂ε
wg
c−d
Q SQ
q∗Q < ∆ q∗Q ∈ (∆ ,1) q∗SQ = 1
Fig. 6 Share of compliance among Quixotes and warm-glow
start to imitate Quixotes if the warm-glow that these latter attach to compliance is
sufficiently strong, satisfying wg > α̂ε .
Proposition 2 can also be read in terms of the ratio of Sanchos in the overall
population, s, as shown in Figure 7. Assuming ∆wg > 0 (otherwise, scenario SQ is
never feasible), then, since ∆ ∈ (0,1), it is easy to see that:
1− ∆wg
∆ 2
< 1−∆wg(≡ sˆ)< 1.
If the ratio of Sanchos in the overall population is small, s < sˆ, only Quixotes com-
ply. They will comply above the equilibrium in the single population game, q∗Q > ∆ ,
if s∈ (1−∆wg/∆ 2, sˆ), and they will comply below ∆ if the ratio of Sancho is smaller
s < 1−∆wg/∆ 2. So, when the ratio of Quixotes is very large, they will be more
strongly inclined to imitate the non-compliant behavior of Sanchos, showing a small
share of compliance.
1− ∆wg∆2 sˆ = 1−∆wg
s
1
Q SQ
q∗Q < ∆ q∗Q ∈ (∆ ,1) q∗SQ = 1
Fig. 7 Share of compliance among Quixotes and s
To better understand this dual possibility of over- and under-compliance, let us
start with a single population of Quixotes at the equilibrium q∗ = ∆ . The incor-
poration of some Sanchos within this population will have a twofold effect on the
compliance decision of Quixotes. Firstly, a positive snowdrift effect is associated
with the snowdrift nature of the game for Quixotes. Since we are in an equilibrium
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with zero compliance among Sanchos, the share of compliance in the global popu-
lation immediately diminishes. Because each Quixote prefers compliance over uni-
versal disobedience, then a lower compliance rate increases the Quixote’s incentive
to comply. Secondly, a negative imitation effect is linked to the imitative revision
protocol. With no Sanchos, compliant Quixotes only compare their payoff against
the lower payoff of non-compliant Quixotes. However, with the entrance of some
Sanchos who do not comply in this Q scenario, compliant Quixotes can now be
paired with non-compliant Sanchos who enjoy a larger payoff (in regions L and M
in Figure 2). This negative imitation effect, given by q(1− p)s[y−∆wg]+, is stronger
the greater the ratio of Sanchos, s, and it is weaker the stronger is the warm-glow
from compliance.
In scenario Q, the share of compliance in the global population, y∗Q, is at least as
large as ∆wg (according to Proposition 2, and also shown in Figure 3). This ratio,
grows with the wg. However, even when Quixotes comply above ∆ , their over-
compliance is not enough to counterbalance the zero compliance among Sanchos.
The compliance rate in the global population is always lower than the compliance
rate in a world without Sanchos:13 y∗Q ≤ ∆ .
In scenario SQ, the warm-glow surpasses α̂ε , satisfying condition (17), then all
Quixotes comply, and some Sanchos also imitate their compliant behavior. Now,
although ∆wg is larger, it serves as an upper bound for the share of compliance in the
global population, y∗SQ ≤ ∆wg ≤ ∆ . Then, in this scenario, the share of compliance in
the global population is again lower than its value in the case of a single population
of Quixotes, y∗SQ ≤ ∆ .
Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that large shares of compliance are associated with
a strong warm-glow and a large ratio of Sanchos in the overall population. Next sub-
section analyzes whether this is a monotonous result. Does a higher warm-glow/a
larger ratio of Sanchos increase compliance among Quixote and among Sanchos
monotonously?
13 This can be immediately proved from (16), provided that y∗Q = q∗Q(1− s). Graphically, as shown
in Figure 2, an equilibrium in region L or M always lies below the y∗Q = ∆ line.
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5 Differences between populations and compliance shares
This section analyzes how the share of compliance in each populations as well as
the share of compliance in the global population are affected by the degree of dis-
similarity between them. In particular we focus, on the one hand, on the gap that
separates payoffs between the two populations, the warm-glow from compliance
and the cold-prickle from defection experienced by Quixotes. On the other hand,
we analyze how compliance is affected by the relative size of each population.
5.1 The distance between Sanchos and Quixotes, (ε,α)
From condition (17) it follows that the feasibility of an equilibrium with positive
compliance among Sanchos increases with the absolute distance between Sanchos
and Quixotes, ε , and particularly, with the warm-glow that Quixotes associate to
compliance, rather than the cold-prickle to defection, measured by α . Furthermore,
as stated in the proposition below, the compliance rates for both types of agents and
in both types of equilibria also increase.
Proposition 3. Under scenario Q, p∗Q = 0 and
∂q∗Q
∂α
,
∂q∗Q
∂ε
> 0⇒
(
∂y∗Q
∂α
= (1−s)∂q
∗
Q
∂α
> 0,
∂y∗Q
∂ε
= (1−s)∂q
∗
Q
∂ε
> 0
)
, ∀s ∈ (0,1).
Under scenario SQ, q∗SQ = 1 and
∂ p∗SQ
∂α
,
∂ p∗SQ
∂ε
> 0⇒
(
∂y∗SQ
∂α
= s
∂ p∗SQ
∂α
> 0,
∂y∗SQ
∂ε
= s
∂ p∗SQ
∂ε
> 0
)
, ∀s ∈ (0,1).
Proof. See Appendix.
At the equilibrium, the compliance rates for Sanchos (when they comply) and
for Quixotes (when only they comply) increase with the discrepancy between the
payoffs obtained by Sanchos and Quixotes, as measured by ε , and in particular, by
the warm-glow from compliance for Quixotes, εα . Consequently, also the share of
compliance in the global population rises with this discrepancy in payoffs between
Sanchos and Quixotes.
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Fig. 8 y∗ level curves for s = 0.25 (left); and s = 0.8 (right)
Figure 8 presents the level curves for the compliance rate in the global population
in the ε−α plane for two different values s= 0.25 and s= 0.8. The level curve y∗ =
1−s, is the frontier delimiting the two scenarios and represents the case in which all
Quixotes comply, q= 1 but still no Sancho imitates this behavior, p= 0. In the gray
region above this dotted line, the figure plots the level curves when all Quixotes
comply together with some Sanchos, y∗SQ ≥ 1− s; and below this dotted line, the
level curves when only Quixotes comply, y∗Q ∈ [0,1− s]. The region below the curve
y∗ = 0 represents (ε,α) combinations with null compliance among Sanchos and
Quixotes.
This figure also highlights the result in Proposition 1, according to which the
existence of an equilibrium with a positive compliance rate among Sanchos requires
a sufficiently large gap between the payoffs attained by Sanchos and Quixotes. To
reach this type of equilibrium, the less dissimilar the payoffs are (ε small), the more
strongly the Quixotes must value compliance (α large), and vice versa. If Quixotes
are not too distinct from Sanchos, the latter would not imitate the former and only
Quixotes would comply. In fact, if Quixotes attain roughly the same (but slightly
higher) satisfaction from compliance, then it is the Quixotes who imitate Sanchos,
ending up with a low, or even a zero compliance rate in the white region below the
y∗ = 0 curve.
By comparing the two graphs in Figure 8, we observe three expected results.
Firstly, the share of compliance in the global population decreases with the percent-
age of Sanchos in the global population. Any point in the ε−α plane is character-
ized by a greater share of compliance in Figure 8 (left) (with a lower ratio of Sanchos
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in the overall population). Secondly, the warm-glow required to induce compliance
among Sanchos decreases with the ratio of Sanchos in the overall population. The
gray area above the curve y∗ = 1− s is greater for s = 0.8 (right) than for s = 0.25
(left). Finally, a greater ratio of Sanchos also makes it easier for some Quixotes to
imitate the non-compliant behavior of Sanchos. Thus, a situation with null compli-
ance in the overall population becomes more likely, represented by a greater white
region below the level curve y∗ = 0. The effect of the ratio of Sanchos in the overall
population is more deeply analyzed in the next subsection.
5.2 The relative size of each population
This section studies how the compliance rates in each population, as well as in the
global population, are affected by the size of the population of Sanchos.14 It is worth
recalling that we consider the size of the two populations as constant. Individuals
may change their strategies, but their preferences remain unchanged, i.e. they remain
within their population. We analyze how differences in populations’ sizes affect,
first the share of compliance in the global population, and second the shares of
compliance in each population.
Proposition 4. The share of compliance in the global population decreases with
the ratio of Sanchos in the overall population. This is true under scenario Q and
scenario SQ:
∂y∗Q
∂ s
< 0,
∂y∗SQ
∂ s
< 0. (23)
Proof. Under scenario Q, the share of compliance in the global population is y∗Q =
q∗Q(1−s)+0s, with q∗Q given in (16). The derivative with respect to s is unequivocally
negative. Likewise, for scenario SQ, y∗Q = 1(1− s)+ p∗SQs, with p∗SQ given in (19).
Again its derivative with respect to s is unequivocally negative.
The share of compliance in the global population decreases with the relative size
of the population of Sanchos. The reasoning is straightforward under scenario Q:
14 Because we have normalized the total population to 1, the ratio of Quixotes is just the comple-
mentary of the ratio of Sanchos.
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the larger the number of non-compliant individuals in the overall population, the
lower the share of compliance. Under scenario SQ, some Sanchos comply mean-
while all Quixotes do comply. Hence, again, the greater the ratio of Sanchos, the
lower must be the share of compliance in the global population. Although the ratio
of Sanchos in the overall population has an undeniable discouraging effect in the
share of compliance in the global population, its effect in each population is not so
clear-cut.
Proposition 5. The share of compliance within the population of Quixotes under
both scenarios can be expressed as a function of the ratio of Sanchos, s:
q∗(s) =

1+∆ −
√
(1−∆)2+4(1−α)sε/σ
2(1− s) if s≤ sˆ (wg≤ α̂ε),
1 if s > sˆ (wg > α̂ε).
This function satisfies q∗Q(0) = ∆ , q∗Q(sˆ) = 1, and it reaches its minimum at:
sq = 1+σ
2∆wg− (1+∆)
√
∆wg
(1−α)ε . (24)
Thus, three situation are feasible:
1. αε > d−1, i.e. ∆wg > 0 and, denoting by α˜ = 1−∆(1−∆)σ/ε:
a. α < α˜ . Then sq ∈ (0,1) and (q∗)′(s) < 0 for s ∈ (0,sq) and (q∗)′(s) > 0 for
s ∈ (sq, sˆ).
b. α ≥ α˜ . Then sq ≤ 0 and (q∗)′(s)> 0 for any s ∈ (0, sˆ).
2. αε < d− 1, i.e. ∆wg < 0. Then sq is a complex number and (q∗)′(s) < 0 for all
s ∈ (0,1).
Proof. See Appendix.
As already mentioned, the relative size of the Sanchos’ population has a twofold
effect on the compliance decision of Quixotes: the snowdrift effect, which induces
Quixotes to increase compliance in a world with a lower compliance rate, due to
the enlargement of the portion of Sanchos; and the imitation effect, which induces
Quixotes to imitate the non-compliant behavior of Sanchos.
If the warm-glow is enough to induce compliance when others disobey, wg >
d− 1, then two situations are possible. For a relatively small α ∈ ((d− 1)/ε, α˜),
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Figure 9 shows that for an initially very small ratio of Sanchos the imitation ef-
fect is stronger. An increment in this population’ size would reduce compliance
among Quixotes who tend to imitate the non-compliant behavior of Sanchos. As
the ratio of Sanchos rises the share of compliance decreases (because there are
more Sanchos who do not comply, and because less Quixotes comply). In conse-
quence, the snowdrift effect becomes stronger than the imitation effect and compli-
ance start rising among Quixotes. Incidentally, when the ratio of Sanchos reaches sˆ,
all Quixotes comply. Conversely, if the warm-glow is relatively strong wrt the cold-
prickle, α ≥ α˜ , then the snowdrift effect is stronger than the imitation effect even
when the size of the Sanchos’ population is very small. The share of compliance
among Quixotes increases monotonously with the number of Sanchos in the overall
population, up until every Quixote complies (see Figure 10).
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By contrast, if the warm-glow is not enough to guarantee compliance when oth-
ers defect, then the share of compliance in the population of Quixotes decreases
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monotonously with the ratio of Sanchos. The imitation effect is stronger regard-
less of each population’s size. More and more Quixotes imitate the non-compliant
behavior of a larger population of non-compliant Sanchos, as shown in Figure 11.
Next proposition analyzes how the share of compliance in the population of San-
chos is affected by the relative size of this population.
Proposition 6. The share of compliance within the population of Sanchos in both
scenarios can be defined as a function of the ratio of Sanchos:
p∗(s) =

0 if s≤ sˆ (wg≤ α̂ε),
−2σ(1− s)− (d−1)+
√
[d−1]2+4σαε(1− s)
2σs
if s > sˆ (wg > α̂ε).
This function satisfies p∗(sˆ) = 0, and it reaches its maximum at:
s¯p =
−2σ(1−∆wg)+(c−d+σ)
√
1−∆wg
αε
. (25)
Proof. Considering p∗SQ in (19) as a function of s, with the help of Mathematica, we
compute the values at which (p∗SQ)′(s) = 0. This equation has a negative root and a
positive root given by s¯p in (25). From (19), we know that p∗SQ(sˆ) = p∗SQ(1) = 0, and
p∗SQ(s) is continuous and strictly positive within the interval (sˆ,1). Moreover there
is a unique positive value s¯p satisfying (p∗SQ)′(s¯p) = 0. In consequence, this value s¯p
must lie within the interval ∈ (sˆ,1) and p∗SQ(s) must reach a maximum at this point.
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As shown in Figure 12, the relative size of the Sanchos’ population has a non-
monotonous effect on the compliance rate of these individuals. Again two forces
are at stake here. As the number of Sanchos in the overall population grows, and the
share of compliance in the global population decreases, also increases the reward
to compliant Quixotes. In consequence more Sanchos are boosted to imitate their
compliant behavior. This is the prevailing force up until s¯p. From this value on, a
second and negative force dominates. As the number of Quixotes decays, although
all of them comply, it becomes less and less likely for Sanchos to be paired with and
to imitate their compliant behavior. Sanchos are more and more often paired to other
Sanchos and the non-compliant dominant strategy in this population starts growing
with p∗SQ(s) tending to zero as s goes to 1.
Corollary 3. The value s¯p decreases with the absolute distance which separates
Sanchos from Quixotes and with the relative importance of the warm-glow with
respect to the cold-prickle:
∂ s¯p
∂α
< 0,
∂ s¯p
∂ε
< 0,
for all α ∈ (0,1) and ε satisfying condition (2).
The compliance rates increase with the absolute distance which separates San-
chos from Quixotes and with the relative importance of the warm-glow with respect
to the cold-prickle:
∂ p∗SQ(s¯p)
∂α
> 0,
∂ p∗SQ(s¯p)
∂ε
> 0.
In particular, the maximum is higher.
Proof. See Appendix.
According to this corollary, the more dissimilar the two populations, or the more
biased towards a greater warm-glow from compliance rather than a cold-prickle
from defection, the wider is the interval with positive compliance among Sanchos.
Moreover, the compliance rate among Sanchos, p∗SQ(s), reaches its maximum for a
lower ratio of Sanchos in the overall population. And this maximum is characterized
by a larger compliance rate, as shown in Figures 12 and 13.
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5.3 Real-life examples
In our everyday life decisions, we continuously compare our gains with those of
others implementing different options. We clearly do so when we take purchasing
decisions as: whether to try a new restaurant instead of our favorite one, where to
go on vacations, or whether to follow the fashion in order to look more attractive.
Likewise, we also observe other people satisfaction in activities like paying taxes,
contributing to voluntary associations, or recycling. We collect information from our
friends and acquaintances and, more and more, we share experiences with unknown
people through the use of the social networks and Internet. And we believe that
it is seldom the case that we share their same preferences. Indeed although (for
simplicity) we are assuming only two type of individuals, one could think that there
are not just but many. Indeed, going to the extreme, each individual could have
his specific payoff matrix, which could be very similar or far dissimilar to his new
neighbor.
An example of how we imitate others and obtain different reward are marketing
campaigns. The fancy car or the pair of jeans that we buy will rarely lead us to the
success that actors pretend to enjoy in the commercials. More connected to social
norms, an example could be the fund-raising television gala for charitable causes.
We observe on TV how rewarding is donating for the celebrities, who act as role
models or influencers. This induces some people, who would have not done other-
wise, to collaborate. Marketing campaigns are often undertaken by the fiscal service
on tax collection, or by the traffic authorities on road safety.
Examples of individuals having different preferences can be more clear when
confronting people from clearly different cultures. An extreme example could be
the missionaries, who are relatively few, whose preferences are rather different from
the locals’, and find highly rewarding to comply with their moral precepts.15 Thus,
as Proposition 1 predicts, it is very likely that some of the locals embrace the mis-
sionaries’ religion.
15 Please, note that we do not mean any superiority of the missionaries’ morality over other reli-
gions.
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To highlight the main findings of the paper, consider individuals who have grown
up in a pleasant neighborhood with a well established culture of following social
norms, either because neighbors really obtain satisfaction from compliance, or be-
cause they dislike or fear the penalty associated with defection. Assume that some
of them move to a dirty and noisy neighborhood where people do not find it attrac-
tive to follow social rules. Then, some of the primitive neighbors might imitate the
compliant behavior of the newcomers. This is more likely the more different the
preferences of the new and the primitive neighbors are, and will only occur if these
latter observe that the newcomers enjoy compliance, rather than dislike defection.
The compliance decisions of newcomers are influenced by two effects. Because
of the deteriorated living environment, the snowdrift effect induces them to com-
ply. Conversely, the inappropriate behavior of the primitive neighbors discourages
compliance. These two effects are stronger the smaller is the share of newcomers.
As stated in Proposition 5 and figures 9-11, if the new neighbors dislike defection,
rather than enjoy compliance, the imitation effect is stronger and they will reduce
their effort, the smaller their relative size. Conversely, if they attain a strong satis-
faction from compliance, the snowdrift effect prevails and the lower their numbers,
the more they will comply.
Conventional neighbors also value a clean and quiet environment, but they prefer
others to pay the cost. As Proposition 6 and figures 12 and 13 state, if there are
many newcomers, conventional neighbors will free ride on them and enjoy a better
neighborhood. Conversely, if the number of newcomers is sufficiently small, the
satisfaction of these latter is so large that some of the primitive neighbors will imitate
them, aiming at a higher welfare. However, with even less newcomers, primitive
neighbors seldom meet them, and therefore very few will imitate their compliant
behavior.
Both newcomers and conventional neighbors will comply higher the more the
newcomers’ preferences differ from the primitive neighbors’, and specially the
greater their inner satisfaction from compliance.
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6 Conclusions
The paper analyzes the compliance with social norms as a social dilemma involving
two types of individuals. The dilemma for pro-self Sanchos is described by a pris-
oner’s dilemma game. On the other hand, pro-social Quixotes still have an incentive
to free ride when others comply, but are willing to pay the cost of compliance when
others deviate. For them, the social dilemma is described as a snowdrift game.
We have analyzed the compliance decisions of pro-self and pro-social norm-
using individuals, when their populations are not isolated from each other. Indi-
viduals in one population play against and imitate individuals from their own and
from the other population. A two-population evolutionary game is defined involv-
ing Sanchos, with a payoffs matrix characteristic of a prisoner’s dilemma game, and
Quixotes, who obtain warm-glow from compliance and cold-prickle from defection,
and whose payoffs matrix is characteristic from a snowdrift game.
Evolutionary dynamics is defined considering an imitative revision protocol, in
particular, pairwise imitation. The imitative dynamics admits a unique asymptoti-
cally stable equilibrium. The nature of this stable equilibrium depends on the char-
acteristics which describe the populations of Sanchos and Quixotes, as well as on
the size of these populations. If the warm-glow that Quixotes attach to compliance
is not too large, or equivalently if the ratio of Sanchos in the global population is
low, then this equilibrium is characterized by zero compliance among Sanchos and a
positive compliance rate (but not complete compliance) for Quixotes. Alternatively,
if the warm-glow for Quixotes is high, then all Quixotes comply together with some
Sanchos. What determines this latter equilibrium is a high degree of dissimilarity
between Sanchos and Quixotes and particularly, a strong warm-glow from com-
pliance rather than a strong cold-prickle from defection. Moreover, the size o the
population of Sanchos also increases the likelihood that some Sanchos imitate the
compliant behavior of Quixotes.
In the first equilibrium type, where only Quixotes comply, they can comply above
or below their compliance in the case of a single population of Quixotes. Thus, at
the equilibrium, they could over-comply to compensate the disobedient behavior
of Sanchos, or imitate them and under-comply. Over-compliance would require a
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strong warm-glow from compliance or a large ratio of Sanchos in the overall popu-
lation.
The absolute distance that separates Quixotes from Sanchos, or the relative size
of the warm-glow over the cold-prickle, facilitates an equilibrium with a positive
compliance rate among Sanchos. Moreover, the wider this gap, the higher the com-
pliance rate in each population, and consequently in the global population. Con-
versely, the compliance rate in the global population decreases with the ratio of
(reluctant-to-comply) Sanchos in the overall population. However, although com-
pliance decreases globally with the percentage of Sanchos, its effect over the share
of compliance in each population is diverse. In the equilibrium where only Quixotes
comply, the ratio of Sanchos in the overall population may increase compliance if
the warm-glow is large, or reduce compliance if it is small. With a moderate warm-
glow, the share of compliance for Quixotes is a u-shaped function of the ratio of
Sanchos in the overall population. In the equilibrium with full compliance among
Quixotes and partial compliance among Sanchos, a larger percentage of Sanchos
increases their compliance rate initially. However, as this ratio becomes close to one
the non-compliant strategy becomes dominant and the share of compliance among
Sanchos decreases to zero.
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Appendix: Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
The system dynamics reads:
p˙
σ
=(1−p)q(1−s)[∆wg−y]+
−p
{
(1−p)s
(
y+
d−1
σ
)
+(1−q)(1− s)[y−∆cp]+
}
, (26)
q˙
σ
=(1−q){q(1−s)[∆−y]++ps[∆cp−y]+}
−q{(1−q)(1−s)[y−∆ ]++(1−p)s[y−∆wg]+}. (27)
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From this system, the evolution of the compliance rates among Sanchos, p, and
Quixotes, q, is analyzed separately for each of the five regions in the α − y plane,
resumed in Figure 2. We can distinguish two situations depending on whether α <
1/2 (∆wg < ∆cp), or α > 1/2 (∆wg > ∆cp). The possible equilibria in each region
and their stability are also studied.
U: y > ∆ . The dynamics reads:
p˙ =−p{(1− y)(y−∆)σ +[(1− p)s+(1−q)(1− s)α]ε]} ≤ 0, (28)
q˙ =−q{(1− y)(y−∆)σ +(1− p)s(1−α)ε]} ≤ 0. (29)
p˙ < 0, except if p = 0 or p = q = 1, when p˙ = 0. Similarly, q˙ < 0, except for
q = 0 or p = q = 1, when q˙ = 0. The point (0,0) /∈ U, while (1,1) ∈ U. Thus
(1,1) is the only equilibrium in this region and it is unstable.
M: max
{
∆wg,∆cp
}
< y≤ ∆ . The dynamics in this region reads:
p˙ =−p{(1− p)s[(y−∆)σ + ε]+ (1−q)(1− s)(y−∆cp)σ}≤ 0,
q˙ = q{(1− y)(∆ − y)σ − (1− p)s(1−α)ε} .
As in region U, p˙ < 0, except if p = 0 or p = q = 1, when p˙ = 0, but (1,1) /∈M.
Furthermore:
q˙≷ 0⇔ (1− y)(∆ − y)σ ≷ (1−α)(1− p)sε.
From this dynamics, the only possible equilibrium in this region must satisfy
p = 0. In this situation q˙ = 0 under equation:
[1−q(1− s)][∆ −q(1− s)] = (1−α)s ε
σ
. (30)
Or equivalently, for p = 0, q˙/q is given by the second order polynomial in q:
q2(1− s)2−q(1− s)(1+∆)+∆ − (1−α)s ε
σ
,
which has one stable and one unstable root. The stable root is given by (16).
L: ∆wg < y≤ ∆cp ≤ ∆ (α < 1/2). The dynamics in this region reads:
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p˙=−p(1−p)s[y+d−1]σ ≤ 0,
q˙={(1−q)y+q(1−p)s}(∆−y)σ−sε[α(p−q)+(1−p)q)].
Still in this region p˙ < 0, except if p = 0 or p = 1, when p˙ = 0. For Quixotes:
q˙≷ 0⇔{(1−q)y+q(1−p)s}(∆−y)σ≷sε[α(p−q)+(1−p)q)].
The equilibrium in this region also requires p = 0. Plugging this into the dynam-
ics of q˙ and equating to zero, leads again to equation (30).
The equilibrium (0,q∗Q) may lie within this region M or region L. It will be lo-
cated in region M if max
{
∆wg,∆cp
}
< q∗Q(1− s)≤ ∆ , and it will lie in region L
if ∆wg < q∗Q(1− s)≤ ∆cp ≤ ∆ .
R: ∆cp < y≤ ∆wg ≤ ∆ (α > 1/2)
p˙ = {p(1− y)+(1− s)q(1− p)}(∆ − y)σ − ε {(1− p)y+(1− s)α(p−q)} ,
q˙ = (1−q)q(1− s)(∆ − y)σ ≥ 0.
In this region q˙ ≥ 0, and q˙ = 0 if q = 0 (which does not belong to R) or q = 1.
For Sanchos, p˙≷ 0 if and only if:[
y+(1− s)p 1−q
1− p
]
(∆ − y)σ ≷ ε
[
y+(1− s)α p−q
1− p
]
,
In the limiting case of a very small ratio of compliant Sanchos, p˙ can be approx-
imated by:
p˙|p=0 = (1− s)qσ [∆wg− y] ,
which in this region is positive, increasing in α and decreasing in s.
The equilibrium in this region requires q= 1, and hence y= ps+1− s. Plugging
this into the dynamics p˙, it follows that p must be either equal to 1 (but p= q= 1
does not belong to R) or satisfy equation:
[ps+(1− s)](∆ − ps− (1− s))σ = ε[ps+(1− s)(1−α)]. (31)
Equivalently, when q = 1, the expression p˙/((1− p)σ) is given by the second
order polynomial in p:
−p2s2− ps [2(1− s)+d−1]+ (1− s) [∆wg− (1− s)] ,
32 Francisco Cabo and Ana Garcı´a-Gonza´lez and Mercedes Molpeceres-Abella
which has one stable and one unstable root. The stable root is given by (19).
B: y≤min{∆wg,∆cp}≤ ∆ . The dynamics reads:
p˙ = (1− p){(∆ − y)yσ − ε[y−q(1− s)α)]} ,
q˙ = (1−q){psσ(∆cp− y)+q(1− s)(∆ − y)σ}≥ 0.
Since y < ∆cp then q˙≥ 0 except if q = 1 or p = q = 0, when q˙ = 0. For Sanchos:
p˙≷ 0⇔ (∆ − y)yσ ≷ ε[y−q(1− s)α].
This system has three equilibria. Two unstable equilibria (p∗,q∗)= (0,0), (p∗,q∗)=
(1,1) (which does not belong to this region), and a stable equilibrium with q = 1
and p given by equation (31).
The equilibrium
(
p∗SQ,1
)
may belong to region R or region B. It will lie in region
R if ∆cp < p∗SQs+(1−s)≤ ∆wg ≤ ∆ , and it will lie in region B if p∗SQs+(1−s)≤
min{∆cp,∆wg} ≤ ∆ .
It is easy to see that q∗Q > 0 for all s ∈ (0,1). Moreover, under condition s <
1−∆wg ≡ sˆ, it can be seen that q∗Q < 1.
It is also immediate to see that condition s < 1−∆wg implies p∗SQ > 0. Likewise,
p∗SQ < 1 under condition−αεs< c−d−αε . But this inequality is always true under
condition (2).
The proof of the asymptotic stability can be found in Cabo and Garcı´a (2018).
Proof of Proposition 2
Conditions (21) and (22) are straightforward from the definition of q∗Q in (16).
Under scenario Q, condition y∗Q > ∆wg is equivalent to q∗Q(1− s)> ∆wg, or:
1+∆ −
√
(1−∆)2+4(1−α)sε/σ
2
> ∆ − (1−α) ε
σ
,
or equivalently:
1−∆ +2(1−α) ε
σ
>
√
(1−∆)2+4(1−α)sε/σ .
The LHS is positive, hence, if we square both sides, after some algebra, we end up
with condition:
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s < 1−∆wg,
which is equivalent to condition (14) that characterizes scenario Q.
Likewise, under scenario SQ, condition y∗SQ <∆wg is equivalent to p∗SQs+(1−s)<
∆wg. Following a similar analysis, we end up with condition s > 1−∆wg, which is
equivalent to condition (17) that characterizes scenario SQ.
Proof of Proposition 3
In the scenario with p∗Q = 0 and q∗Q > 0,
∂q∗Q
∂α
=
sε
(1− s)σ
√
(1−∆)2+4(1−α)sε/σ > 0,
and
∂q∗Q
∂ε
=
√
(1−∆)2+4(1−α)sε/σ +1−∆ −2(1−α)s
2σ(1− s)
√
(1−∆)2+4(1−α)sε/σ .
This latter derivative is positive if and only if:√
(1−∆)2+4(1−α)sε/σ > 2(1−α)s− (1−∆).
If the RHS of this inequality was negative, ∂q∗Q/∂ε > 0. Conversely, if the RHS was
positive, raising both sides to the square, and rearranging terms,
sα > s−
[
1−∆ + ε
σ
]
.
But according to (15), an equilibrium with no compliance among Sanchos requires
s < 1−∆ +(1−α)ε/σ < 1−∆ + ε/σ . Therefore, the RHS in inequation above is
negative and hence, it always holds, which proves ∂q∗Q/∂ε > 0.
In the scenario with q∗SQ = 1 and p∗SQ > 0,
∂ p∗SQ
∂α
=
(1− s)ε
s
√
(ε−σ∆)2+4σαε(1−s) > 0,
∂ p∗SQ
∂ε
=
(1− s)α
s
√
(ε−σ∆)2+4σαε(1−s) > 0.
The marginal effect of α and ε in the global compliance rates immediately follows,
provided that y∗Q = q∗Q(1− s) and y∗SQ = p∗SQs+(1− s).
Proof of Proposition 5
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Considering q∗Q in (16) as a function of s, one can prove that (q∗Q)′(s) R 0 if and
only if:
(1−α)2(1− s)2
( ε
σ
)2
−∆wg
(
1−∆ 2+4(1−α) ε
σ
)
Q 0. (32)
It is ease to see that αε < d− 1 implies that the expression in (32) is positive, and
therefore, (q∗Q)′(s)< 0, regardless of the value of s.
For the more general case of αε > d−1, the expression in (32) vanishes for two
values of s, one greater than one and the other given by sq in (24). From Proposition
1 we know that q∗Q < 1 for all s ∈ (0, sˆ) and q∗Q(sˆ) = 1.
• If sq ∈ (0, sˆ), then, being q∗Q(s) a continuous function, it must hold true that
(q∗Q)′(s)< 0 for s∈ (0,sq) and (q∗Q)′(s)> 0 for s∈ (sq, sˆ). Therefore, if sq ∈ (0, sˆ),
q∗Q(s) would start at q∗Q(0) = ∆ , decrease to reach its minimum at q∗Q(sq) and in-
crease from that point till q∗Q(sˆ) = 1.
• It is nonetheless possible that sq < 0 and in that case, q∗Q(s) would monotonously
increase from q∗Q(0) = ∆ , for all s ∈ (0, sˆ), again to q(sˆ) = 1.
We can compute, with the help of Mathematica, the unique value of α at which
sq = 0, given by α˜ = 1−∆(1−∆)σ/ε . Moreover, after some algebra, it can be
proven that ∂ sq/∂α < 0 if and only if:
(1+∆)2(1−α)2
( ε
σ
)2
+4(1−∆)2∆wg∆ > 0.
And this is true whenever αε > d−1 and hence ∆wg > 0. In consequence, if α > α˜ ,
sq < 0 and q
∗
Q(s) increases for all s ∈ (0, sˆ), while for α < α˜ , sq > 0 and q∗Q(s) shows
a u-shape within (0, sˆ).
Proof of Corollary 3
The derivatives ∂ s¯p/∂α and ∂ s¯p/∂ε are both negative under the same condition:
[2(c−d)−αε](c−d+σ)> 4(c−d)σ
√
(1−∆wg).
After some tedious algebra, this condition can be transformed to:
(1−∆wg)[(c−d−σ)2+2(c−d)]+4αε(c−d)> 0,
which clearly holds.
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Proving that ∂ sˆ/∂wg < 0 is straightforward.
Finally, as stated in Proposition 3, ∂ p∗SQ/∂α > 0 and ∂ p∗SQ/∂ε >. Therefore, also
the maximum is reached at a higher value.
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